# azul

# **Azul Vulnerability Detection**

### Software Supply Chain: Vulnerable 3rd Party Code



**MORE 3RD PARTY CODE** 

40% - 80%

Of code in new software projects<sup>1</sup>





**MORE VULNERABILITIES** 

200+

In 3<sup>rd</sup> party Java libraries and apps in Q1 alone<sup>2</sup>





MORE EXPOSURE

56%

Of security pros lack confidence that running applications are tested to find and fix high risk vulnerabilities that an attacker may exploit<sup>3</sup>

Sources: 1. Gartner, A Software Bill of Materials Is Critical to Software Supply Chain Management, 2. Based on analysis of National Vulnerability Database, 3. IBM, The state of vulnerability management in the cloud and on-premises

# How did you handle LOG4J

**S** 

One of the Most Serious Software Vulnerabilities in History<sup>1</sup>

Did You Have an Accurate List of Where Log4j Was Running?

52% of Teams Spent a Month or More Remediating<sup>2</sup>

Did Log4j Vulnerabilities Stay Away
After You First Got Rid of Them?

How Prepared Are You for the Next Serious Vulnerability?

48% of Teams Gave Up Holiday or Weekends to Remediate<sup>2</sup>

How Confident Are You in Knowing What's in Your Java Estate?

Sources: 1. <u>US Dept of Homeland Security</u> 2. <u>(ISC)<sup>2</sup> Pulse Survey</u>

## Many Commercial Scanners Were/Are Wrong.

#### 2021 - Quarkus Accused a Lot



### Quarkus is not affected by the Log4J Vulnerability



#### By Max Rydahl Andersen

As many of you have heard, the Java community has been rocked by a widespread vulnerability in the Apache Log4l 2 logging library. You can find more details about this vulnerability in CVE-2021-44228

Since Quarkus, its extensions, and dependencies do not use the log4j version 2 core library, it is **NOT susceptible** to this vulnerability. In most cases, no corrective action is required for any Quarkus backed projects you may have. Quarkus does expose the log4j API jar which in itself is not vulnerable. This is purely a compatibility and translation layer, which maps calls to a different logging backend (JBoss Logging). Therefore, any direct usage of the log4j API is not impacted.

#### False Positives in Security Scans

eween a transitive dependency and what

actually ends up bundled and/or configured in your application.

Thus we do see reports from such tools falsely claiming Quarkus or some of its extensions in its ecosystem are affected although in practice they are not.

Examples of such finds are <u>Camel NSQ</u>, <u>Camel Corda</u> and <u>Vert.x</u> which in their transitive dependencies include a log4j-core iar but it is never used nor in any form activated when using Ouarkus.

You will see us do updates in Quarkus and Quarkus extensions to reduce these false positives. As a user and consumer of Quarkus, your application is not exposed to the log4j vulnerability.

### 2023 - Snyk Still Cites False Positives



#### False Positives and Automation Overload: 61% of Respondents Say Automation Has Increased False Positives

A high percentage of organizations are automating some or all of their security measures in the code pipeline. 64% of organizations have automated code analysis, 61% have automated software update management, 59% have automated testing (unit, security), and 58% have automated secure coding practices (linters, formatting, etc.). Nearly half have automated container and infrastructure configuration scanning. Automation of secrets detection lags at only 38%. Respondents indicated that automated security tooling has considerably increased the rate of false positives in vulnerability reports. Twice as many respondents said security automation had increased false positives, with 60% stating automation had increased false positives versus 30% saying automation had decreased false positives.

The percentage of false positives was non-trivial. 62% of respondents said that 25% or more of vulnerability alerts they received were false positives, and 35% said false positives represented 50% or more of vulnerability alerts. This high rate of false positives likely contributes to on the surface would seem to be a surprisingly low vulnerability fix rate. 38% of respondents remediate 50% or less of vulnerabilities reported by their systems. Another 35% remediate 75% or less of vulnerabilities reported by their systems. Surprisingly 10% of respondents remediate less than 25% of vulnerabilities reported in alerts.

2023 State of Open Source Security

"62% of respondents said that 25% or more of vulnerability alerts were false positives, and 35% said false positives represented 50% or more of vulnerability alerts."

### The JVM Can Improve Your Accuracy

### **Keep Shifting Left**

### Validate & Monitor Right

- Keep scanning custom code.
- Keep scanning containers & workloads.
- Keep working with teams.
- Do what you're doing today. It's great.


- Java applications are already using the JVM.
   Nothing extra to install or manage.
- Decrease False Positives by learning what code loads - focus on these vulnerabilities first.
- Performs well in dev/QA and Production.

### How you benefit:


- 1. Less time installing/managing security tools.
- 2. Focus on results that matter, not everything.
- 3. Decreased "alert fatigue" and "dashboard fatigue."

## What Information Can My JVM Provide?

What do I have? Is it vulnerable? Do I actually load that code?



## **Complete Visibility: Left & Right**



### **Azul Vulnerability Detection**

Renaissance in Java Security



## Ongoing Detection at Point-of-Use In Production

- All environment coverage: dev, test, production
- All Java software: custom, 3rd party, contracted



### Focus Effort by Eliminating False Positives


- Accurate by watching code load
- Prioritize code that runs over code that rests
- Detection that understands Java conventions



## No-Ops with Transparent Performance

- No additional agent
- No additional work
- Part of Azul JVMs (including free builds of OpenJDK)

## Code Inventory: Do I use that? Can I remove code?




Many applications have had code written over the years that teams are afraid to touch. How can you know what you can remove?

- Primarily for long-developed applications.
- Decreases difficulty barriers to deprecating/removing unused and dead code:
  - o Removing code reduces maintenance.
  - Removing code reduces attack surface.
- Data must come from production.
  - Little to no performance impact.
- An API-First way to learn what you do/don't call.

## **Azul Vulnerability Detection - Metadata Collected**


NO application data NO secrets

VM Instance
VM Event
VM Jar Loaded
VM Class Loaded
VM Method First Called
VM Performance Metrics
System Info
Customer defined tags



https://docs.azul.com/vulnerability-detection/detailed-information/what-info-is-transmitted

### **AVD Architecture**



- No performance hit. NO AGENTS.
  - JVM already collects this data.
- Forwarder keeps JVMs isolated on customer network and consolidates data to send.
- JVMs are isolated one-way communicators. No communication back to JVM.
- CVE and Component knowledgebase in cloud.

**No New Dashboards!** 

Integrate into what you use.

### **Azul Vulnerability Detection**



- A New Approach to Security
  - Leverages Azul JVMs (including free builds of OpenJDK)
    - Runs in Production



### WHAT CAN IT DO FOR YOU

- ✓ Fills Critical Security Gap
- ✓ Detection at Point of Use
- ✓ Eliminates False Positives



#### WHAT IT IS NOT

- - Yet Another Dashboard